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and unclear. There have been some departures from prevalent common law stan-
dards since the Rogers case. The old theory of direct causation, in sharp decline
at common law, is apparently gaining ground. This extends the employer's liability
beyond the zone of foreseeable risk, and limits it only by the situation existing at
the time and place of his negligence. In the field of intervening causes as well,
"foreseeability" has been in decline as a formula for limiting the employer's lia-
bility. It is clear, however, that there is some point at which he is no longer liable
for the harm he has caused. The conduct of a third person may be such that
responsibility will "shift" from the negligent employer, or an intervening cause
may be so abnormal, or may bring about a result so unrelated in any rational
sense to the harm he has threatened, that he will be relieved of liability. It is
impossible, and probably undesirable, to attempt to state any rule as to when this
will happen and when it will not. So far the courts have been unwilling to ignore
the relation between the original negligence and the resulting harm, suggesting
perhaps that the concept of proximate cause is too deeply involved with the
theory of negligence to be ever torn loose.
Nothing, however, is really impossible in this special statutory liability of
employer to employee. There is always the Kernan case, with its largely ignored
suggestion of liability without end following any breach of duty Thus far the
courts, while they have gone beyond the foreseeable, have stopped short of the
fantastic, but Kernan, like Everest, is "there," waiting for some court to scale its
heights and proclaim liability for the most fantastic consequences of a negligent
act.
William L. Osterhoudt*
* Member, Second Year Class.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ADMIRALTY
An exception to the general rule that damages are intended to compensate
the injured party, punitive damages are awarded, both as a punishment and a
deterrent, in cases involving "a positive element of conscious wrongdoing."1
While punitive damages are not a substitute for crimnal sanctions, 2 they repre-
sent an area in which non-crunnal courts have borrowed from the criminal law
to give additional compensation to the injured party by punishing the wrongdoer
for Ins evil state of mind. Although often criticized, punitive damages are generally
accepted by both state and federal courts,3 and it is reasonable to expect that the
same behavior which justifies the award of punitive damages in ordinary tort
actions would be present in actions which fall within the jurisdiction of the
admiralty courts. However, there are very few admiralty cases which actually
1 McComcx, D.AMES § 79 (1935).
2See, e.g., Allen v. Rossi, 128 Me. 201, 146 AUt. 692 (1929); State v. Shevlin-
Carpenter Co., 99 Minn. 158, 108 N.W 935 (1906).
3 McCowMrc, D.A :cFs § 78 (1935).
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award punitive damages, raising a question as to the acceptance of this doctrine
by admiralty courts.
Unfortunately, the award of punitive damages in some areas has been pre-
cluded by the wording and judicial interpretation of statutes under winch re-
covery is sought. However, there still remain several areas in winch punitive
damages should be utilized by the admiralty courts as in common law courts, to
punish outrageous behavior and to prevent its recurrence.
Restitutio in Integrum
It was stated in 1936 that "damages in admiralty are not decreed to punish
and the doctrine applicable is restitutio in tntegrum,"4 winch would restrict the
recovery of the injured party to the cost of returning hun to his orginal condition.
In light of the expressions in the following cases, however, it is arguable that
the rule of restitutio in integrum is only a guideline for determining actual damages
and not an absolute limitation of damages in admiralty to compensation.
Before 1859
There are no American cases prior to 1859 in winch punitive damages were
actually awarded, but several courts discussed the doctrine with apparent approval.
These courts reasoned that while punitive damages were not warranted by the
particular fact situations involved, punitive damages might be justified if the
case had involved slightly different facts.
The most significant of these cases is The Amiable Nancy,5 decided by the
Supreme Court in 1818, winch discussed the question of who might be liable for
punitive damages. The Court held that in an action for marine trespass the
owners of the offending vessel were "not bound to the extent of vindictive
damages," 6 because they had neither participated in nor authorized the trespass.
The Court apparently viewed punitive damages as a desirable means of punishing
the wrongdoer, not as any compensation due to an injured party for the wrong
done, and noted that "if this were suit against the orgmal wrongdoers, it might
be proper to go yet farther, and visit upon them in the shape of exemplary
damages, the proper punishment winch belongs to such lawless misconduct."7
The problem of what sort of conduct might entitle a libelant to punitive dam-
ages was presented to the Circuit Court in Massachusetts in 1816.8 In an action
for wages brought by the owner of a slave discharged before the return voyage,
the court refused to allow the recovery of wages from the end of the return
voyage up to the commencement of the suit, but suggested that "if there bad been
in the case at bar gross fraud, enticement, or oppression, there might have been
some reason to have decreed the compensation by way of punishment." The
court felt, then, that punitive damages in admiralty, as in common law, required
not just wrongful behavior or negligence, but an element of intentional and
4 The West Arrow, 80 F.2d 853, 858, 1936 A.M.C. 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1936). See
also The Baltimore, 75 U.S. (8 Wall) 377 (1869).
5 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818).
6 Id. at 559.
7 Id. at 558.
8 Emerson v. Howland, 8 Fed. Cas. 634 (No. 4441) (C.C. Mass. 1816).
9 Id. at 638.
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conscious misconduct-an evil and wanton disregard of the rights of the other
party.
Another example of the state of mind necessary to warrant an award of
punitive damages is found in Murray v. The Charming Betsy.1o In that case, a
captain of a United States ship, executing orders in his best judgment, mstakenly
seized another ship. In an action by the owner of the seized vessel, the Court
refused to award punitive damages because the captain was not guilty of wanton
disregard of the rights of the other party by merely following his orders. There
was nothing about his conduct deserving of punishment.
The broader question of the validity of punitive damages in admiralty cases
generally was discussed by Justice Story in 1820.11 In an action for patent in-
fringement, Justice Story affirmed an award of counsel fees and rejected an earlier
demal by the Supreme Court of counsel fees 12 as doubtful authority. He stated
that "in cases of marine torts, or illegal captures, it is far from being uncommon in
the admiralty to allow costs and expenses, and to mulct the offending parties, even
in exemplary damages, where the nature of the case requires it."13 He added, "it
would be impossible to reconcile the case [denying counsel fees] with the
general doctrines of admiralty courts, or with the more recent and well estab-
lished practice of the supreme court in cases of marine torts and prize.14 This is
a strong indication that the early courts did not regard punitive damages as a
stranger to admiralty.
While punitive damages were not awarded in admiralty prior to 1859, these
cases point out the possibility of an award of punitive damages and provide a
general outline of the principle involved. In an action against the original wrong-
doeriS whose behavior amounts to intentional nsconduct, 16 an admiralty court
could award punitive damages. Just such a situation arose in 1859.
Gallagher v. The Yankee
In 1859 the District Court for the Northern District of Califorma awarded
puntive damages in a maritime tort case.'7 The libel was brought against the
captain of The Yankee for the unlawful deportation of the libelant from California
to the Sandwich Islands. The court awarded exemplary damages, stating that, "for
a tort of this lund-hgh-handed and deliberate, in open and contemptuous
violation of the hitherto supposed inviolable rights of the citizen-the court
should award exemplary damages."
18
The Yankee is significant for several reasons. It is the only case in which an
award of punitive damages was actually made by an admiralty court. Despite this
106 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
11 Boston Mfg. Co. v. Fiske, 3 Fed. Cas. 957 (No. 1681) (C.C. Mass. 1820).
12 Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 306 (1796).
13 Boston Mfg. Co. v. Fiske, 3 Fed. Cas. 957 (No. 1681) (C.C. Mass. 1820).
14 Id. at 958.
15 The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818) (dictum).
16Emerson v. Howland, 8 Fed. Cas. 634, 638 (No. 4441) (C.C. Mass. 1816)
(dictum).
17 Galagher v. The Yankee, 9 Fed. Cas. 1091 (No. 5196) (N.D. Cal. 1859), aff'd,
30 Fed. Cas. 781 (No. 18124) (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1859).
i8 Id. at 1093.
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fact, the court did not discuss the uniqueness of the award and evidenced no
hesitancy with regard to the authority of an admiralty court to assess punitive
damages in cases involving maritime torts. Moreover, the case has only been cited
once n subsequent cases involving punitive damages. 19 ,
The Yankee is import'ant because it provides some guidelines for the award of
punitive damages in admiralty It follows the general rule of punitive damages in
recognizing that a wrong which involves malice or a willful disregard of individual
rights cannot be adequately dealt with under the principle of restitutio in integrum.
The actual monetary damage suffered by the libelant was not great, but the be-
havior of the libelee was outrageous. Compensatory damages would have returned
the injured party to Ins original condition, but only exemplary damages would
have been a punishment and a deterrent to the wroiigdoer.
After 1859
Following Gallagher v. The Yankee several cases arose which, while not allow-
ing punitive damages, suggest principles for their use. There are four problem
areas: (1) the extent to which the intent or indifference of the wrongdoer is a
factor in awarding punitive damages; (2) the award of punitive damages in
actions in rem; (3) the extent to which the principal is liable in punitive damages
for the acts of his agent; and (4) the recovery of punitive damages in actions for
breach of contract. In addition to these cases, writings by major legal scholars
appeared which help to define these prnciples.
20
Somewhat more than a wrongful act or negligence is required before punitive
damages may be awarded in admiralty The general rule in common law courts
is that if the "wrongdoing has been intentional and deliberate, and has the
character of outrage frequently associated with crime,"21 punitive damages may be
awarded. This same rule probably also applies in admiralty. A few cases illustrate
this. Prior to 1859 the courts denied punitive damages on the ground that there
had been no "gross fraud, enticement, or oppression,"22 or on the ground that the
conduct was not a wanton disregard of the rights of the other party.23 In The
Normania24 the court denied exemplary damages against a steamship company,
finding that the company had no intent to deceive the libelant, a passenger who,
upon mquiry, was erroneously told there would be no steerage passengers aboard
the vessel. In 1895 another court denied exemplary damages for breach of charter
party by illegal detention of the vessel finding that the charterer acted under legal
advice in detaining the vessel.
25
While the courts have used such vaned terms as "gross" 26 misconduct, or
'9 The William H. Bailey, 103 Fed. 799, 800 (D.C. Conn. 1900) (private damages
denied in a suit in rem).
202 SUTHEnLAND, DAmAGEs § 292 (1916); 2 SEDGEWICK, DAwAGEs § 599(b) (9th
ed. 1912).
2 1 PlossER, TORTS § 2, at 9 (3d ed. 1964).
2 2 Emerson v. Howland, 8 Fed. Cas. 634, 638 (No. 4441) (C.C. Mass. 1816).
23 Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
24 62 Fed. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1894).
25 The Mascotte, 72 Fed. 684 (D.C.N.J. 1895).
26 Emerson v. Howland, 8 Fed. Cas. 634, 638 (No. 4441) (C.C. Mass. 1816).
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"malice"27 or "lawless nusconduct," 28 it Is clear that if the courts will award
punitive damages at all, they will only do so for wrongs involving a "positive
element of conscious wrongdoing." 29
There are two views on the applicability of punitive damages to actions in
rem. One court has taken the view that the doctrine of punitive damages cannot
be applied to actions in rem. 20 "In the American admiralty a tort creates a man-
time lien or pnvilege,--a ]us in re. This lien or privilege, however, is only as
security for actual damages for the wrong done, for which the slhp herself is
bound to make compensation."3 '
The other possible view is that if the shipowner acted out of malice, punitive
damages might be recovered in an action in rem. In The Seven Brothers32 the court
refused to allow punitive damages in an action in rem stating, "as the libel is in
rem, and thus in effect against the owner of the vessel, who is not proved to have
had any share in or knowledge of the malicious act, punitive damages cannot be
awarded."33 The language used by tlus court would not entirely exclude punitive
damages from an action in rem, but would require the libelant to prove malice on
the part of the owner of the vessel. This argument rests upon the premise that an
action in rem is in effect an action against the owner and should not necessarily
be restricted to the actual injury suffered.
Two leading writers on damages in the early part of the century reached
different conclusions on this question. Sutherland stated that admiralty courts
could award punitive damages, "though not in a suit %n rem against a vessel for a
maritime tort."34 Sedgewick reached an entirely different conclusion, arguing, "if
the owner himself is master, or authorizes the act, no reason is perceived why he
should not be responsible in exemplary damages, whether the proceeding is in
rem or in personam."35 This view appears to be more in harmony with the purpose
of punitive damages to punish malicious behavior and does not protect a wrong-
doer merely because the action brought is in rem.
The third problem area is the liability of a principal for the acts of his agent.
In admiralty this problem is most frequently encountered in actions against the
owner of the vessel for acts done by the master or crew of the vessel. Probably the
most explicit statement of what acts by the seaman will incur liability on the part
of the owner to the extent of punitive damages appears in The Ludlow.3 6 The
court demed punitive damages against the shipowner for wrongful impnsonment
of a seaman, on the basis that the shipowner is exempt from punitive damages
"unless it can be shown that the owner acquiesced in or ratified the wrong, or
that the deed was perpetrated in the line of the agent's authority."37 The question
27 McCowM cK, DAmAGES § 79 (1935).
28 The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546, 558 (1818).
29 McCoRMir , DAmGcEs § 77 (1935).
30 The William H. Bailey, 103 Fed. 799 (D.C. Conn. 1900).
31 Id. at 800.
32 170 Fed. 126 (D.R.I. 1909).
33 Id. at 127.
3 4 2 SuTamur-, DAMAcES § 392 (4th ed. 1916).
a5 2 Sm xwicK, DAmAGEs § 599(b) (9th ed. 1912).
36280 Fed. 162 (N.D. Fla. 1922).
37 Id. at 163-64; accord, Pacific Packing & Navigation Co. v. Fielding, 136 Fed. 577
(9th Cir. 1905).
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of the liability of the principal to the extent of punitive damages for the acts of his
agent acting within the general scope of authority without participation or ratifica-
tion by the principal is one which has plagued all of our courts38 and has not been
clearly decided by our common law courts.3 9
The final problem area involves liability for punitive damages for breach of
contract. It is a general rule that punitive damages are not recoverable in an
action for breach of contract, even though the breach is intentional and accom-
pained by malice.40 In Crowley v. S.S. Arcadia41 punitive damages were demed
in an action for breach of contract to carry passengers. However, the court based
the demal on the lack of malice or wrongful intent and not on a general rule against
such an award. The general rule is so widely accepted, however, that it is unlikely
that punitive damages could be recovered in an action for breach of contract. An
exception to this rule is recognized where the breach amounts to an independent
cause of action for tort.42 In The Normanz 43 a passenger brought an action for
false representations with respect to the presence of steerage passengers. Punitive
damages were demed bcause of a lack of intent to deceive. An award of punitive
damages in this type of case should not be summarily rejected merely because the
representations were made in connection with a contract.
These four problem areas involve the question of punitive damages in solated
types of admiralty cases. Just as Justice Story commented on the general avail-
ability of punitive damages to admiralty courts in 1820, 44 Sedgewick and Suther-
land each reached the same conclusion nearly one hundred years later. In 1912
Sedgewick stated that "exemplary damages are awarded in admiralty, as in other
junsdictions."45 Sutherland stated in 1916 that "as a rule a court of equity will not
award such damages, but courts of admiralty will." 46 However, neither of these
writers cited cases which actually award punitive damages.47
38 McCop-c, D~cxAEs § 80 (1935).
39 The Supreme Court has demed liability where there has been no participation
or express ratification by the principal. Lake Shore M.S. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101
(1893). However, a more recent federal case argued that the real question was not
whether there had been express ratification but whether the act was participated in by
so much of the principal's organization that the behavior "can fairly be said to be truly
that of the principal." General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Froelich, 273 F.2d 92, 94
(D.C. Cir. 1959). This rule seems to be more applicable to large corporations in winch
an agent's behavior may only rarely be ratified by a high ranking corporation official.
4 0 Otto v. Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co., 277 F.2d 889 (8th Cir. 1960); Young v.
Main, 72 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1934); Crogon v. Metz, 47 Cal. 2d 398, 303 P.2d 1029
(1956).
41 1965 A.M.C. 988 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
42Peitzman v. City of Illmo, 141 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1944); Chelim v. Nien, 32
Cal. 2d 480, 196 P.2d 915 (1948).
43 62 Fed. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1894).
44 Boston Mfg. Co. v. Fiske, 3 Fed. Cas. 957 (No. 1681) (C.C. Mass. 1820).
452 Sx nEwicx, DAMAGEs § 599(b) (9th ed. 1912).
46 2 SuTHmu.N, DAmAGEs § 392 (4th ed. 1916).
4 7 Sutherland cited The Annable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818), and
Boston Mfg. Co. v. Fiske, 3 Fed. Cas. 957 (No. 1618) (C.C. Mass. 1820).
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Punitive Damages and Maintenance and Cure
Admiralty recognizes several remedies which present special problems in the
award of punitive damages. A shipowner is absolutely liable without fault to the
seaman for maintenance and cure for all injuries and sicknesses which arise while
the seaman is m the service of the ship, with the exception of injury or illness
caused by the seaman's gross and willful misconduct or existing at the time the
seaman signed on the ship and knowingly concealed by hum. 48 Basically, the
recovery is limited to the cost of maintaining and curing the injured or sick seaman.
But "if the master or owner fail to provide proper care and as a result the seamans
condition is aggravated, the shipowner is liable not only for the increased medical
expenses and maintenance that may become necessary, but also for resulting
damages. That is to say, following such a breach of duty the seaman may recover
full tort damages "49
Such a situation was present in the case of Vaughan v. Atkinson5o in which the
seaman brought an action for maintenance and cure and damages for willful and
persistent failure to pay maintenance and cure. The Supreme Court reversed a
denial of damages and awarded counsel fees as damages to the seaman, stating:
"The default was willful and persistent. It is difficult to imagine a clearer case of
damages suffered for failure to pay maintenance and cure than this one. 51
Vaughan v. Atkinson is the first case to allow counsel fees in an action for
maintenance and cure, and the award has been viewed as special damages52 and
as a judicial penalty. 53 In Justice Stewart's dissent, he asserted that there was no
basis for awarding counsel fees as damages for failure to pay maintenance and
cure, but he did recommend that punitive damages would be appropriate in thins
case "if the shipowner's refusal to pay maintenance stemmed from a wanton and
intentional disregard of the legal rights of the seaman."54 To give punitive
damages in such a situation would be in line with the view that once the ship-
owner has breached his duty to provide maintenance and cure, he is liable for
full tort damages. Because of the importance of maintenance and cure to the
seaman, the award of exemplary damages in cases involving a flagrant violation
of the duty to meet this obligation would both compensate the seaman for that
failure, and at the same time discourage a repetition of this behavior.
Punitive Damages and Unseaworthiness
It has been well established m this country since 1903 that both a ship and
the shipowner are "liable to an indemnity for injuries received by seamen in
consequence of the unseaworthmess of the slp."55 This duty "is absolute and is
48 Gmmoi & BLAcx, ADNm ALTY 254 (1957).
49 Id. at 270.
5o 369 U.S. 527, 1962 A.M.C. 1131 (1962).
51 Id. at 531, 1962 A.M.C. at 1134.
52 111 U. PA. L. REv. 684, 686 (1963).
53 12 CAmTHouc U. L. REv. 62, 64 (1963).
54Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 540, 1962 A.M.C. 1131, 1141 (1962) (dis-
senting opimon).
55 The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
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not satisfied by due diligence."56 This remedy has come into much greater use in
recent years, and "in most cases the pleader would be better off to rely exclusively
on unseaworthmess," 57 rather than joining this claim with one under the Jones
Act.58 However, this remedy has been described as limited to providing compensa-
tion for the injuries received. In 1920 Hughes stated that "for a breach of this
duty, the owner is liable for compensatory damages,"50 and several courts
have described a recovery for unseaworthmess as compensatory. 60 Because this
duty is based on strict liability providing compensatory relief, it is likely that the
doctrine of restitutio in integrum is controlling, and punitive damages could not
be recovered in an action based on unseaworthmness.
In addition to the traditional remedies for maintenance and cure and unsea-
worthiness, Congress in the last fifty years has seen fit to give maritime workers
and others certain statutory remedies to provide added assurance of compensation
for personal injury. These acts include the Jones Act,61 the Death on the High
Seas Act,62 the Public Vessels Act, 63 and the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act.64 Due to a combination of the wording and the judicial in-
terpretation of these acts, it can be said that in all probability recovery under these
acts is limited to actual damages.
Punitive Damages and the Jones Act
The Jones Act65 provides that any seaman injured in the course of his em-
ployment may, at his election, maintain an action at law with the right of trial
by jury against his employer for the employer's negligence. In the event the
seaman is killed, his personal representative may bring an action at law for
wrongful death and certain causes of action survive. This act does not provide an
action for longshoremen and other harbor workers whose rights against their em-
ployers are covered by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act.
66
The question of the availability of punitive damages under the Jones Act was
recently presented in Phillip v. United States Lines Co. 6 In an action for the
wrongful death of a seaman under the Jones Act against the shipowner the court
denied a motion for retrial on the issue of punitive damages, saying that it was
not necessary to decide whether a corporate shipowner could be held liable for
punitive damages in an action under the Jones Act since the requisite elements
for an award of punitive damages were not present in this case.
While the court in Phillip v. United States Lines Co. did not rule out the
56 GmoP.E & BLACK ADmALy 252 (1957).
57 Id. at 316.
58 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
59 HuGHEs, ADumIIILTY 205 (2d ed. 1920).6o Rogosich v. Umon Dry Dock & Repair Co., 67 F.2d 377, 1934 A.M.C. 219 (3d
Cir. 1933); Globe S.S. Co. v. Moss, 245 Fed. 54 (6th Cir. 1917).
6141 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
6241 Stat. 537-38 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1964).
6343 Stat. 1112-13 (1925), 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-99 (1964).
6444 Stat. 1424-46 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
6541 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
6644 Stat. 1424-46 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
67240 F Supp. 992, 1965 A.M.C. 1494 (D. Pa. 1965).
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possibility of punitive damages under the Jones Act, the cases which have dealt
with related problems seem to do so. The Jones Act provides that "in such action
all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right
or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply .... 68
Seamen are placed "on the same basis as railway employees under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act."
69
McCormick has stated that the Federal Employers' Liability Act denies a
recovery of punitive damages, 70 and the following cases support that conclusion.
In 1911 the Federal Employers' Liability Act was construed as limiting a re-
covery by the statutory beneficiaries of a deceased railroad employee to the
"pecuniary injury or loss sustained by the beneficiaries . .. excluding all con-
sideration of punitive damages ..... 71
A few cases have dealt with the nature of compensation under the Jones Act
itself. These cases do not involve punitive damages specifically, but the con-
clusions which the courts reach have a bearing on the issue. It seems apparent that
damages under the Jones Act are "compensatory" 72 and "limited to actual
pecuniary loss."
7 3
However, section 59 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act7 4 provides that
the deceased employee's own right of action survives for the benefit of certain
beneficiaries. Section 59 has been interpreted to include damages for the de-
cedent's pain and suffering before death. 73 While this section has not been taken
to mean that the beneficiaries can recover punitive damages, some of the re-
coveries for pain and suffering would seem to approach that result.76 The Jones
Act provides this same relief for pain and suffering,77 and the same use of pain
and suffering awards might be made in cases involving deceased seamen.
Punitive Damages and the Death on the High Seas Act
The Death on the High Seas Act78 creates a right of action in the personal
representative on behalf of the spouse, parent, child or dependent relative of a
person killed as a result of wrongful act, neglect, or default occuring on the high
6841 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
69 PRossER, TORTS § 82, at 561 (3d ed. 1964); see Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264
U.S. 375, 1924 A.M.C. 551 (1924); Sabine Towing Co. v. Brennan, 85 F.2d 478 (5th
Cir. 1936).
70 McConmicK, DA,IAGES 287 (1935).
71 Cain v. Southern Ry., 199 Fed. 211 (C.C.E.D. Tenn. 1911).
72 Petition of Southern S.S. Co., 135 F. Supp. 358, 363 (D. Del. 1955); see also
Sabine Towing Co. v. Brennan, 85 F,2d 478 (5th Cir. 1936).
73 Gerardo v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 383, 385 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
74 36 Stat. 291 (1910), 45 U.S.C. § 59 (1964).
75 Great No. Ry. v. Capitol Trust Co., 242 U.S. 144 (1916).
76 GiRE & BLAcK, ADImALTY 307 (1957). For example, one District Court
awarded $40,000 for pain and suffering in an action under the Jones Act. Naylor v.
Isthmian S.S. Co., 94 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). This decision was reversed because
of errors in the admission and exclusion of evidence. 187 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1951). How-
ever, the court did not discuss the excessiveness of this award. If awards of this size are
permitted to stand, they may be used by the jury as a means of punishment.
77 Cleveland Tankers v. Tierney, 169 F.2d 622, 1949 A.M.C. 151 (6th Cir. 1948).
7841 Stat. 537-38 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1964).
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seas, against the vessel, person, or corporation which would have been liable if the
person had not been killed. The Act specifically limits the recovery to a "just
compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the
suit is brought."7 9 The wrongful death statutes of Illinois,80 Maine8 ' and New
Jersey82 are similarly worded and punitive damages have been rejected in those
states.8 3 In light of this limitation, it seems apparent that recovery under the Death
on the High Seas Act is limited to actual monetary loss to the beneficiaries as a
result of the death-an amount based on decedents life expectancy, his probable
earnings, and his contributions to the beneficiaries.
8 4
Unlike the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the Death on the High Seas Act
does not contain a provision expressly providing for survival of decedents action
and allowing, by implication, an additional recovery for pain and suffering before
death. The narrow limits of the Death on the High Seas Act would seem to pre-
clude an award of punitive damages.
Punitive Damages and State Wrongful Death Statutes
An action for wrongful death may fall into one of three categories. It may be
an action for the death of a seaman against his employer in which case the Jones
Act8 5 applies. It may be an action arising more than three nautical miles from
shore and the Death on the High Seas Act,86 and in an action for the death of a
seaman against his employer, the Jones Act8 7 also applies. However, if the action
arises in the territorial waters of a state, and does not involve an action for the
death of a seaman against his employer, the state wrongful death acts may apply.
It has been decided that the federal courts sitting in admiralty will apply the law
of the state where death occurred.88
It is in this third category of cases that the admiralty court might be expected
to award punitive damages. If the state in which the death occurred permits a
recovery of punitive damages, the admiralty court would presumably also permit
such a recovery. While many state wrongful death statutes do not provide for
recovery of punitive damages, there are many which expressly or impliedly do.
They fall into three distinct categories. The first type of statute is entirely punitive.
That is, the entire award for wrongful death is based on culpability and is therefore
viewed as punitive in nature. Massachusetts89 and Alabama 90 have such statutes.
The second type of statute expressly provides for an additional award of punitive
damages to be added to the compensatory damages. The statutes of South
79 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1964).
8 0 Ir.. REv. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1963).
slME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2552 (1964).
82N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-5 (1952).
8 Meehan v. Central R.R., 181 F Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Conant v. Griffin,
48 Ill. 410 (1868); Oakes v. Maine Cent. R.R.,,95 Me. 103, 49 Aft. 418 (1901).
84 GILo & BLAcx, ADMRTY 306 (1957).
85 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
8041 Stat. 537-38 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1964).
8741 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
8 8 Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
89 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 229, § 6E (1958).
9O A A. CODE tit. 7, § 123 (1958); see McDonald v. The Barge 204, 194 F Supp.
383, 1961 A.M.C. 1205 (S.D. Ala. 1961).
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Carolina 91 and Kentucky92 are typical of tis type. The third category embodies
those states statutes which do not expressly provide for punitive damages but
which have been interpreted by the state courts to impliedly provide for punitive
damages. Typical are the statutes of Virgima 93 and MississippiP 4
A district court recently allowed a recovery of compensatory damages by the
wife of a deceased seaman from her husband's employer under the Jones Act
and in addition a recovery of punitive damages by the wife against the owner of
a barge also involved in the accident under the Alabama Wrongful Death Act.9 5
While tis was not an admiralty court, it is likely that the same result would be
reached in admiralty courts applying state wrongful death statutes allowing puin-
tive damages.
Punitive Damages and State Survival Statutes
Under the general maritime law a cause of action for personal injuries re-
sulting from a maritime tort does not survive the death of the in]ured party or
the torffeasor.9 6 In order to remedy this situation, Congress passed the Jones Act
9 7
and the Death on the High Seas Act.98 These acts create causes of action for
wrongful death and, under the Jones Act, for the survival of certain other causes
of action. However, neither of these acts allows a recovery of punitive damages.
As a result, these statutes do not act to provide a recovery of punitive damages
for personal injuries in the American admiralty if the in]ured party dies as a con-
sequence of the tortious conduct. This limitation may be overcome in certain cases
by the application of state survival statutes. While there are no cases winch deal
with the survival of a maritime claim for punitive damages, cases have been
presented which may be applicable to such claims.
In 1941 the Supreme Court decided that if a cause of action exists under the
general maritime law, the admiralty court may adopt a state survival statute to
preserve the cause of action.9 9 In 1964 the Court held that while a seaman's claim
based on unseaworthmess does not survive under the general maritime law or the
Jones Act, it may be preserved under the survival statute of the state in whose
waters death occurs. 100
If the general maritime law permits the recovery of punitive damages, there
seems to be no reason why the admiralty courts should not perserve such a claim by
adopting the state survival statute. In O'Leary v. United States Lines Co.,10 1 the
court argued that in determining whether a claim should be preserved under a
state survival statute, the court must first establish that the clain existed under
91 S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1954 (1962).
92 Ky. REv. STAT. § 411.130 (1960).
93VA. CoDE Aaii. § 8-636 (1950). See 46 VA. L. REv. 1036 (1960).
9
4 Miss. CoDE ANN. § 1453 (1964 Supp.). See also Bush v. Watkins, 224 Miss. 238,
80 So. 2d 19 (1955).
9 5 McDonald v. The Barge 204, 194 F. Supp. 383, 1961 A.M.C. 1205 (S.D. Ala. 1961).
96 DuNLA", CouRTs oF AnmiaAtLTr 87 (1836).
9741 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
98 41 Stat. 537-38 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1964).
99 Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 1940 A.M.C. 1110 (1941).
100 Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 1965 A.M.C. 1 (1964).
101 215 F.2d 708 (1st Cir. 1954).
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the general maritime law, not state substantive law. The court pointed out the
inconsistancy of holding that general maritime principles should be applied to
torts if the injured party survives and state substantive law to establish tort
liability if the party dies and his claim is preserved by state law. For instance, if a
passenger is killed in the territorial waters of a state, the question is not whether
the state substantive law would allow a recovery of punitive damages, but
whether the general maritime law would allow punitive damages and is the
state survival statute effective to perserve such a claim for punitive damages.
There are several states which have statutory provisions for the survival of clams
for punitive damages after the death of the injured party. While the question has
not been settled in most states, the statutes of Texas 10 2 and MissIssippi"'3 have
been interpreted as permitting the survival of claims for punitive damages.
10 4
The Nevada Survival Statute'0 5 expressly provides for the survival of these claims,
and the courts of Florida have discussed but not decided this question.10 6 The
Georgia"' 7 statute expressly precludes a recovery against the representative of a
deceased wrongdoer but is silent as to a recovery by the representative of the
injured party
Two problems remain to be considered. First, does the Jones Act conflict with
the application of state survival statutes? Second, does the Death on the High Seas
Act conflict with the state survival statutes, or more simply, may these state
survival statutes be applied to torts on the high seas?
The first problem deals with the conflict between the Jones Act and state
survival statutes. In Gillespze v. United States Steel Corp.0 8 the Court held that
while the Jones Act is the exclusive remedy for the wrongful death of a seaman,
it is not exclusive with respect to survival of actions. In other words, if the seaman
had a cause of action under the general maritime law mdependant of statute, the
claim may be preserved by state statute. 10 9 It would seem, then, that if the
seaman was injured under circumstances which would entitle him to a recovery
of punitive damages under the general maritime law, this claim might be pre-
served by applying the state survival statute. For example, if a seaman dies as
the result of the intentional misconduct of his employer, the Jones Act does not
preclude a recovery of punitive damages which may be warranted under the
general maritime law and preserved by a state survival statute.
The second problem involves the application of state survival statutes to torts
committed on the high seas. Several recent district court cases have held that
state survival statutes may be applied to preserve claims ansing on the igh seas
which would not survive under the Death on the High Seas Act"0 or the Jones
i02 Tx. REv. Civ STAT. ANN. art. 5525 (1958).
103 MIss. CoDE ANN. tit. 23, §§ 609-10 (1956).
104 Wagner v. Gibbs, 80 Miss. 53, 31 So. 434 (1902); Houston-Amencan Life Ins.
Co. v. Tate, 358 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
105 NLv. lEv. STAT. § 41.100 (1957).
1
0 6 FLA. STAT. § 45.11 (1965). See Fowlkes v. Simmons, 101 So. 2d 375 (Fla.
1958).
10 7 
GEORGA CoDE. ANN. § 3-504 (1962).
108 379 U.S. 148, 1965 A.M.C. 1 (1964); accord, Holland v. Steag, 143 F Supp.
203, 1965 A.M.C. 1843 (D. Mass. 1956).
109 The Court applied this rule to preserve a clami based on unseaworthiness.
11 o41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
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Act."' In Holland v. Steag, Inc.,"12 the court held that an admiralty court may
apply the state survival statute of the domicile of the tortfeasor to preserve a claim
based on the general maritime law. This rule has been applied to preserve claims
for pain and suffering" 3 and to preserve a claim for all personal m]unes,ii 4 neither
of which would survive under the Death on the High Seas Act.
The decision in each of these cases is based on the conclusion that the Death
on the High Seas Act is not exclusive as to survival of causes of action arising on
the high seas. It may be, then, that if the injured party had a cause of action for
punitive damages under the general maritime law, that cause of action may
survive under the state survival statute of the domicile of the tortfeasor even
though the cause of action accrued on the high seas.
Punitive Damages and Other Statutory Remedies
The Public Vessels Act"15 provides that a "libel in personam in admiralty may
be brought against the United States,"" 6 for damages caused by a public vessel of
the United States, "and for compensation for towage and salvage services"" 7
rendered to a public vessel of the United States. Similarly, the Suits in Admiralty
Act1 18 provides that in cases involving merchant vessels owned and operated by
the United States, a recovery in personam may be had agamst the United States
if a recovery could have been had in rem or in personam against a private owner.
Punitive damages could not be recovered under these statutes since the only
remedy given is against the United States. The United States is immune from
suit unless Congress removes such immunity," 9 and statutes winch waive
immunity are to be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign.,20
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Acti2 1 provides
compensation for disability or death to injured maritime employees except govern-
ment employees, and masters and crews of vessels. The compensation is limited
by statute and is the exclusive remedy against the employer. It appears, therefore,
that punitive damages could not be recovered under its provisions. The act does
not preclude a recovery against third parties for torts' 22 and presumably would
not preclude a recovery of punitive damages in such action based on the general
maritime law.
Concluston
Although punitive damages may have been eliminated in the areas in whic'h
recovery is based on federal statute, the utility of punitive damages in other types
of admiralty suits should not be overlooked.
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